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Infinite Population Utilitarian Criteria

Author

Listed:
  • Geir B. Asheim
  • Kohei Kamaga
  • Stéphane Zuber

Abstract

We examine utilitarian criteria for evaluating profiles of wellbeing among infinitely many individuals. Motivated by the non-existence of a natural 1-to-1 correspondence between people when alternatives have different population structures, with a different number of people in each generation, we impose equal treatment in the form of Strong Anonymity. We show how a novel criterion, Strongly Anonymous Utilitarianism, can be characterized by combining Strong Anonymity with other regularity axioms (Monotonicity, Finite Completeness, and continuity axioms) as well as axioms of equity, sensitivity, separability, and population ethics. We relate it to other strongly anonymous utilitarian criteria and demonstrate its applicability by showing how it leads to an efficient and sustainable stream in the Ramsey model.

Suggested Citation

  • Geir B. Asheim & Kohei Kamaga & Stéphane Zuber, 2022. "Infinite Population Utilitarian Criteria," CESifo Working Paper Series 9576, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9576
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    Cited by:

    1. Asheim, Geir B. & Kamaga, Kohei & Zuber, Stéphane, 2022. "Maximal sensitivity under Strong Anonymity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C).
    2. Pivato, Marcus, 2022. "A characterization of Cesàro average utility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    utilitarianism; intergenerational equity; population ethics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • Q01 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Sustainable Development

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