Collusion in Beauty Contests
AbstractDuring the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so-called Beauty Contests. There seems to be a wide consensus among economists that in these and other contexts like privatisation an auction is the better selling mechanism. However, why exactly an auction should be preferred is unclear. Here we present an argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi dimensionality on issues involved in this process. The important assumption we make is that bidding firms do not know the preferences of the government. As a consequence, during a beauty contest participants are uncertain about the final decision of the government. This uncertainty enables firms to collude.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 724.
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
auctions; collusion; beauty contests.;
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- Lukach, R. & Plasmans, J.E.J., 2002. "Measuring Knowledge Spillovers using Patent Citations: Evidence from the Belgian Firm's Data," Open Access publications from Tilburg University, Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-92281, Tilburg University.
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