It is common belief that the wages that we observe are above the level that would prevail in a competitive labour market and also it is common to believe that wage moderation should be encouraged as a way to keep unemployment down. This paper considers whether we can have confidence in these beliefs. It presents a number of models designed to cast doubt on the conventional wisdom. First, we show that in an efficiency wage model in which there is involuntary unemployment, a binding minimum wage may increase employment. We then present a general equilibrium matching model in which there is involuntary unemployment but wages are below market-clearing levels and raising wages can reduce unemployment. We then consider the empirical evidence on employment and wage determination to argue that it is just as consistent with this model as with models in which wages are at or above market-clearing levels.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by Centre for Economic Performance, LSE in its series CEP Discussion Papers with number
dp0195.
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Shilov, Andrey & Tourovsky, Boris, 2008.
"The minimum wage in the dominant firm model,"
IAB Discussion Paper
200823, Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung (IAB), Nürnberg [Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg, Germany].
[Downloadable!]
Isabelle Méjean & Lise Patureau, 2008.
"Location decisions and Minimum Wages,"
THEMA Working Papers
2008-06, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: