Entre 1975 y 2003 la Argentina protagonizó la mayor involución de la historia económica mundial. Entre estos años, la masa de pobres creció de aproximadamente el 5% hasta el 50%. Como consecuencia, nacieron las organizaciones de la nueva pobreza. En diciembre de 2001, éstas derrocaron a dos presidentes constitucionales. A partir de esa crisis, las organizaciones populares adquirieron una suerte de poder de veto extra-constitucional sobre la gestión de gobierno. Es por eso que el presidente Duhalde adelantó las elecciones cuando murieron dos piqueteros, cuyos actos ilegales estaban siendo reprimidos según manda la ley. Frente a esos límites en su capacidad de maniobra interna, el presidente Kirchner cooptó dirigentes piqueteros. Auspició la elección de algunos como legisladores e incorporó a otros en funciones de gobierno. Esta táctica, acompañada del fuerte crecimiento económico de la Argentina durante sus años de gestión, desactivó la protesta callejera. Sin embargo, ninguna de las propuestas programáticas radicalizadas que algunos de estos dirigentes auspiciaban se convirtieron en política del gobierno. Cuando los dirigentes piqueteros reaccionaron, ya era tarde. El crecimiento del empleo y la disminución de la pobreza habían disminuido el poder de sus organizaciones. English: Between 1975 and 2003, Argentina underwent the most acute regression in world economic history. Between these years, the number of people below the poverty line grew from approximately 5% to 50% of total population. As a consequence, protest organizations emerged with ever increasing power. In December 2001 they overthrew two constitutional presidents. From that crisis onward, they attained a para-constitutional veto power over governments. This is the reason why President Duhalde called for anticipated elections when two picketers were killed as a consequence of the lawful repression of their unlawful actions. Vis-à-vis these limits to his domestic power, President Kirchner decided to incorporate picketing leaders in the state itself. He encouraged the election of some as legislators and co-opted others as government officials. This tactic, which was accompanied by the strong economic growth rates of Argentina during his years in office, deactivated street protests. Notwithstanding, none of the radical government programs promoted by the picketing leaders which had been co-opted in the state were implemented by the government. When the picketing leaders reacted, it was too late. The growth of employment and the decrease of poverty had deprived their organizations of part of their power.
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