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Eavesdropping selects for conspicuous signals

Author

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  • Lichtenberg, Elinor M
  • Zivin, Joshua Graff
  • Hrncir, Michael
  • Nieh, James C

Abstract

Animal communication signals generally evolve to become increasingly conspicuous for intended receivers [1]. However, such conspicuous signals are also more susceptible to eavesdropping, i.e. exploitation by unintended receivers [2]. It is typically thought that eavesdroppers harm signalers and select against conspicuous signals [3]. But, if signal conspicuousness deters eavesdroppers by indicating a cost, all receivers benefit. This may occur when eavesdroppers exploit food recruitment signals but need to fight for food access [4]. Using eusocial insects, stingless bees, we show that conspicuous signals can indicate competitive costs and enable signalers to escape eavesdropper-imposed costs. The dominant eavesdropper, Triogona hyalinata, avoided higher levels of Trigona spinipes pheromone that indicate a food source difficult to win, and showed attraction to lower pheromone levels that indicate a relatively undefended resource. Our decision-analysis model reveals that eavesdropping individuals that can assess takeover costs can benefit their colony by recruiting to weakly defended resources and avoiding costly takeover attempts. © 2014 Elsevier Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Lichtenberg, Elinor M & Zivin, Joshua Graff & Hrncir, Michael & Nieh, James C, 2014. "Eavesdropping selects for conspicuous signals," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt2gm6j9bk, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdl:ucsdec:qt2gm6j9bk
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