A Demand-Side Theory of Antitakeover Defenses
AbstractThis article develops a demand-and-supply framework to analyze the adoption of antitakeover defenses and constructs a demand-side theory of antitakeover provisions ("ATP's"). The article views the decision to go public without ATP's as a decision to produce an unshielded target and shows that the classic literature focused on the costs of producing such a target but barely accounted for demand-side considerations. The article argues that the more firms there are producing unsheilded targets (and, therefore, the fewer firms adopting ATP's), the lower the price the market is willing to pay for the unshielded product. The reason for this is that not only do ATP's prevent takeovers, they also divert takeover activity to unshielded targets. The combination of existing supply-side explanations with the novel demand-side theory works to explain the findings of recent empirical studies of ATP's at IPO stage firms that have puzzled the corporate finance and corporate law literature.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics in its series Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series with number qt3z24c8t1.
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2003
Date of revision:
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lisa Schiff).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.