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'Consumer' versus 'Customer': the Devil in the Detail

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Author Info
Pinar Akman () (Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia)
Abstract

The ultimate objective of EC competition rules is arguably the enhancement of ‘consumer welfare’. In EC competition law, however, ‘consumer’ merely means ‘customer’. Not being limited to final consumers, the concept also encompasses intermediate customers. Moreover, according to the EC Commission, under Article 82EC, harm to intermediate customers is generally presumed to create harm to consumers and where intermediate customers are not competitors of the dominant undertaking, there is no requisite to assess the effects of conduct on users further downstream. This paper questions the appropriateness of this presumption in light of recent advances in economics, specifically that of vertical restraints and in particular non-linear pricing. It uses this literature to show that there are many instances where an increase (decrease) in ‘customer welfare’ does not cause an increase (decrease) in ‘consumer welfare’. In these cases, the presumption is devoid of economic justification and likely to lead to decisional errors. The paper concludes that if the law is to serve the interests of ‘real’ consumers, the EC Commission should reconsider this presumption and its interpretation of the ‘consumer’ in ‘consumer welfare’. Until then, it remains questionable and objectionable whose interests EC competition law and in particular, Article 82EC, serve.

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Paper provided by Centre for Competition Policy, University of East Anglia in its series Working Papers with number 08-34.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2008
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Handle: RePEc:ccp:wpaper:wp08-34

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Related research
Keywords: Article 82EC; abuse of dominance; consumer welfare; customer welfare; final consumers; intermediate customers;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kimmel, Sheldon, 1992. "Effects of Cost Changes on Oligopolists' Profits," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 40(4), pages 441-49, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. John Simpson & Abraham L. Wickelgren, 2007. "Naked Exclusion, Efficient Breach, and Downstream Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(4), pages 1305-1320, September. [Downloadable!]
  3. Greg Shaffer, 1991. "Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 120-135, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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