Awareness and AIDS: A Political Economy Model
AbstractWe present a simple political economy model that explains two major puzzles of government policies to combat HIV/AIDS epidemic: the lack of policy response in many countries where the epidemic is massive and the reversal of the downward trend in HIV prevalence in the countries that have adopted early agressive prevention campaigns. The model builds on the assumption that the unaware citizens impose a negative externality on the aware by increasing the risk of contagion. Prevention campaigns raise awareness of the current generation, which then partially transmit this awareness to the next generation, thus creating political support for the next-period awareness campaigns. The economy has two steady-state equilibria: the "good" one (with high awareness and low prevalence) and the "bad" one (low awareness, high prevalence). The "good" equilibrium is fragile, i.e. a sufficiently large exogenous drop in HIV prevalence undermines the next-generation political support for campaigns and makes the economy drift away towards the "bad" equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 92.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
HIV/AIDS; voting; overlapping generations; awareness;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2009-02-14 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2009-02-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-DGE-2009-02-14 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-HEA-2009-02-14 (Health Economics)
- NEP-POL-2009-02-14 (Positive Political Economics)
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- De Donder, Philippe & Leroux, Marie-Louise, 2012.
"Behavioral Biases and Long Term Care Annuities: A Political Economy Approach,"
IDEI Working Papers
749, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Feb 2013.
- De Donder, Philippe & Leroux, Marie-Louise, 2012. "Behavioral Biases and Long Term Care Annuities: A Political Economy Approach," TSE Working Papers 12-352, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Feb 2013.
- Philippe De Donder & Marie-Louise Leroux, 2012. "Behavioral Biases and Long Term Care Annuities: A Political Economy Approach," CESifo Working Paper Series 3972, CESifo Group Munich.
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