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Awareness and AIDS: A Political Economy Model

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Author Info
Gani Aldashev
Jean-Marie Baland

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Abstract

We present a simple political economy model that explains two major puzzles of government policies to combat HIV/AIDS epidemic: the lack of policy response in many countries where the epidemic is massive and the reversal of the downward trend in HIV prevalence in the countries that have adopted early agressive prevention campaigns. The model builds on the assumption that the unaware citizens impose a negative externality on the aware by increasing the risk of contagion. Prevention campaigns raise awareness of the current generation, which then partially transmit this awareness to the next generation, thus creating political support for the next-period awareness campaigns. The economy has two steady-state equilibria: the "good" one (with high awareness and low prevalence) and the "bad" one (low awareness, high prevalence). The "good" equilibrium is fragile, i.e. a sufficiently large exogenous drop in HIV prevalence undermines the next-generation political support for campaigns and makes the economy drift away towards the "bad" equilibrium.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 92.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:92

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Related research
Keywords: HIV/AIDS; voting; overlapping generations; awareness;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Cited by:
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  1. Elena Vigna, 2009. "Mean-variance inefficiency of CRRA and CARA utility functions for portfolio selection in defined contribution pension schemes," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 108, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2009. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-30.


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