This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

What Is the Objective of Professional Licensing? Identification of a Static Model of Licensing and Some Evidence from the US Market for Lawyers

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mario Pagliero

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for lawyers. The results imply that lawyers' salaries have a large weight relative to social welfare in the objective function of licensing boards.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.carloalberto.org/files/no.106.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 106.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:106

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Via Real Collegio, 30, 10024 Moncalieri (To)
Phone: +390116705000
Fax: +390116476847
Email:
Web page: http://www.carloalberto.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Giovanni Bert).

Related research
Keywords: professional licensing; legal market; bar exam;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc stands for Research Papers in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-2.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.