Learning Standards of Social Behaviour in a Stationary Society
AbstractIn this paper I propose a general model of repeated strategic interaction with possibly private information, which is particulary suitable to study learning processes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge in its series Cambridge Working Papers in Economics with number 9610.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 1996
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Web page: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/index.htm
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