This article examines what may be taken into account, when designing a mechanism of international public finance to support south-north cooperation on domestic climate policies in developing countries. We draw lessons from existing mechanisms of conditional transfers. Experience with conditionality provisions that the World Bank, the IMF, and bilateral donors apply to development assistance is varied. Conditionality provisions applied during the EU enlargement process are generally evaluated more positively, as the shared objective is increased credibility and participation. Clearly defining global emissions reductions as a shared objective could offer similar opportunities for cooperation. We discuss lessons that might be of relevance to the design of cooperative climate policy.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
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