This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

The Impact of Risk on the Decision to Exercise an ESO

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Kyriacos Kyriacou
Abstract

This paper examines the impact of firms’ risk on executives’ decisions to exercise their executive stock options (ESOs). As the proportion of executives’ remuneration linked to the value of their firm (and therefore shareholder wealth) has increased, so the extent to which these executives hold undiversified personal portfolios has also increased. This lack of personal diversification gives executives a strong incentive to exercise early. It has been shown that this incentive can be sufficiently strong to outweigh the beliefs an executive may have regarding the firm’s valuation. I hypothesise that as the risk of a firm increases, so an ESO exercise is less likely to be induced by an executive’s private information. Consistent with the need to diversify, I find that it is only exercises in low risk firms that precede significantly negative abnormal returns.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.brunel.ac.uk/329/efwps/03-18.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics and Finance Section, School of Social Sciences, Brunel University in its series Public Policy Discussion Papers with number 03-18.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bru:bruppp:03-18

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH, UK

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (John.Hunter).

Related research
Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Fama, Eugene F & French, Kenneth R, 1992. " The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(2), pages 427-65, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, 1998. "Are CEOs Really Paid Like Bureaucrats?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(3), pages 653-691, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hemmer, Thomas & Matsunaga, Steve & Shevlin, Terry, 1996. "The influence of risk diversification on the early exercise of employee stock options by executive officers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 45-68, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. John D. Lyon & Brad M. Barber & Chih-Ling Tsai, 1999. "Improved Methods for Tests of Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(1), pages 165-201, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Brav, Alon & Gompers, Paul A, 1997. " Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 1791-1821, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 1996. "Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ittner, Christopher D. & Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 2003. "The structure and performance consequences of equity grants to employees of new economy firms," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 89-127, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Fama, Eugene F., 1998. "Market efficiency, long-term returns, and behavioral finance1," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 283-306, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Carpenter, Jennifer N & Remmers, Barbara, 2001. "Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 74(4), pages 513-34, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Loughran, Tim & Ritter, Jay R, 1995. " The New Issues Puzzle," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(1), pages 23-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Chan, Louis K C & Jegadeesh, Narasimhan & Lakonishok, Josef, 1996. " Momentum Strategies," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1681-1713, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Jin, Li, 2002. "CEO compensation, diversification, and incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 29-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Jegadeesh, Narasimhan & Titman, Sheridan, 1993. " Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: Implications for Stock Market Efficiency," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 65-91, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Kahl, Matthias & Liu, Jun & Longstaff, Francis A., 2003. "Paper millionaires: how valuable is stock to a stockholder who is restricted from selling it?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 385-410, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Chip Heath & Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, 1999. "Psychological Factors And Stock Option Exercise," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 601-627, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Huddart, Steven, 1994. "Employee stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 207-231, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Narasimhan Jegadeesh, 2001. "Profitability of Momentum Strategies: An Evaluation of Alternative Explanations," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(2), pages 699-720, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 2003. "Information distribution within firms: evidence from stock option exercises," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 3-31, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-9.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.