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Optimal fines for cartel agreements: the case of Slovakia

Author

Listed:
  • Richard Kalis

    (Department of Economic Policy, University of Economics in Bratislava)

  • Martin Labaj

    (Department of Economic Policy, University of Economics in Bratislava)

  • Daniela Zemanovicova

Abstract

The paper deals with theoretical and empirical aspects of optimal fines for cartel agreements with a special focus on the practices of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic. First, we discuss the theoretical requirements in order to make fines for cartel agreements effective in the sense of preventive and repressive function. Then, we review the current literature on the empirics of fines for cartel agreements. In the empirical part, we evaluate the fines for cartel agreements in the Slovak Republic. The analysis is based on a unique dataset collected from publicly available information on cartel agreements cases of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Kalis & Martin Labaj & Daniela Zemanovicova, 2016. "Optimal fines for cartel agreements: the case of Slovakia," EAPG Working Paper Series 011, Department of Economic Policy, Faculty of National Economy, University of Economics in Bratislava.
    • Handle: RePEc:brt:wpaper:011
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    File URL: https://nhf.euba.sk/www_write/files/katedry/khp/eapg/wp011.pdf
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cartel agreements; fines; competition policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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