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Collective Behavior with Information Asymmetry

Author

Listed:
  • Zhi Cao

    (Chinese University of Hong Kong)

  • Arthur Lewbel

    (Boston College)

  • Wenchao Li

    (Tongji University)

  • Junjian Yi

    (Peking University)

Abstract

We propose a new method for identifying bargaining power in collective house- hold models, based on information asymmetry. Our model allows household members to exploit an information advantage for bargaining. We formulate the household’s decision process under partial information disclosure using a Bayesian persuasion framework. We use this structure to point identify utility and bargaining power, which would not be identified under symmetric information. We illustrate these results by showing that our model can ex- plain known empirical outcomes regarding child educational investment and development in Chinese households where one parent is a migrant.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhi Cao & Arthur Lewbel & Wenchao Li & Junjian Yi, 2024. "Collective Behavior with Information Asymmetry," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 1070, Boston College Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:1070
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Collective model; Information asymmetry; Bargaining power; Bayesian persuasion; Left-behind children;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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