Evan Shellshear () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)
Abstract
This paper investigates the suitability of apportionment methods based on the idea of preserving the coalition function of the simple game represented by the populations of the states. The results show that an apportionment method which satisfies desirable properties such as population monotonicity, house monotonicity, etc., does not exist. A classification of simple voting games via winning coalitions is also given.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number
391.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior