The Set of Correlated Equilibria 2 x 2 Games
AbstractWe develop a geometric procedure to get all correlated equilibria in a 2 x 2 game. With this procedure we can actually "see" all the correlated strategy profiles of a given game and compare it to the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium profiles. Games without dominant strategies fall into two different equivalence classes: (i) competitive games, that have a unique correlated equilibrium strategy, and (ii) coordination and anticoordination games, whose set of correlated equilibria is a polytope with five vertices for which we provide general closed-form expressions. In this latter case, there are either three or four vertices for the payoffs. In contrast, the convex hull of the Nash equilibrium strategies and payoffs always have three vertices.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Barcelona Graduate School of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 79.
Date of creation: Oct 2003
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- Laruelle, Annick & Iñarra García, María Elena & Zuazo Garín, Peio, 2012. "Games with perceptions," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-64, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
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