This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Some Doubts About Arguement by Hypothetical

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Paul Robinson (University of Pennsylvania Law School)
Abstract

In his paper, Why the Successful Assassin Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, Leo Katz "pick[s] up the gauntlet [Sandy] Kadish throws down" to offer a nonconsequentialist justification for giving significance to resulting harm and, in particular, to justify the common practice of punishing attempts less than the completed offense. In one sense, I may not be the ideal person to serve as critic. I am not one of those who, like Kadish and others, does not believe in the significance of resulting harm in assessing blameworthiness (people whom Katz calls the "luck- skeptics" but to whom I will refer as the "nonbelievers" in the significance of resulting harm).I will try to perform the mental gymnastics of pretending to be a nonbeliever as I evaluate Professor Katz's arguments. As Part I explains, I fear the nonbeliever will be unpersuaded. Whatever the outcome of the debate as Professor Katz presents it, the method of his argument raises issues that I think are just as interesting as its outcome. My social science work, as limited as it is, gives me pause when assessing the argument-by-hypothetical method that Professor Katz uses so ingeniously here (and elsewhere). Relatedly, I have some doubts about using our intuitions in the way Professor Katz would have us use them here (and elsewhere), or at least doubts about whether we can draw from them the kind of conclusions about moral desert that Professor Katz would have us draw.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=upenn/wps
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Pennsylvania Law School in its series Scholarship at Penn Law with number upenn_wps-1051.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation:
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bep:upennl:upenn_wps-1051

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.law.upenn.edu/

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords: Philosophy and Law;

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About five million pdf files are downloaded through RePEc every year.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-15.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.