Victim Interdependence in the Accident Setting
AbstractThis paper considers the case that potential victims affect each other by taking care. Analyzing standard liability rules, we show that strict liability with a defense of contributory negligence is in the best position to induce the efficient outcome, i.e., this liability rule ensures efficiency if victims affect each other negatively - care by one victim increases the accident exposure of other victims - and makes the attainment likely if victims affect each other positively - if care by one victim decreases the accident exposure of other victims. In contrast, the other standard liability rules fail to induce first-best care.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Berkeley Electronic Press in its series German Working Papers in Law and Economics with number 2008-1-1217.
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victim interdependence; care incentives; liability rules; tort law;
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- Tim Friehe & Eric Langlais, 2014. "On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments," EconomiX Working Papers 2014-8, University of Paris West - Nanterre la Défense, EconomiX.
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