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The independence of economic authorities and supervisors. The case of the Banco de España. Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Audit Committee on Democratic Quality / Congress of Deputies, 22 December 2020

Author

Listed:
  • Pablo Hernández de Cos

    (Banco de España)

Abstract

In his testimony, the Governor’s analysis of the impartiality and autonomy of independent economic authorities contributes to the Committee’s review of the “measures needed to strengthen the impartiality and independence of independent authorities and regulatory agencies”. He first reviews the arguments warranting the independence of economic authorities and supervisors. He then goes on to address the features that conform an institution’s formal independence, detailing their specific form in the case of the Banco de España. Next, he reflects on the status of independence as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the proper performance by independent agencies of their functions. He then highlights possible measures for strengthening the independence of the Banco de España, and identifies potential improvements to the financial supervision model in Spain. Lastly, he refers to the Bank’s control mechanisms and transparency standards, and certain aspects of its governance.

Suggested Citation

  • Pablo Hernández de Cos, 2021. "The independence of economic authorities and supervisors. The case of the Banco de España. Testimony by the Governor of the Banco de España before the Audit Committee on Democratic Quality / Congress ," Occasional Papers 2105, Banco de España.
    • Handle: RePEc:bde:opaper:2105e
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    File URL: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosOcasionales/21/Files/do2105e.pdf
    File Function: First version, February 2021
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    File URL: https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/PublicacionesSeriadas/DocumentosOcasionales/21/Fich/do2105.pdf
    File Function: Spanish version
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    independent economic authorities; independent agencies; economic supervisors; independence; accountability; transparency; governance; central bank; governor; financial supervision model; code of conduct; collegiate decisions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • K1 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law
    • Y80 - Miscellaneous Categories - - Related Disciplines - - - Related Disciplines

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