Adopting Price-Level Targeting under Imperfect Credibility in ToTEM
AbstractUsing the Bank of Canada's main projection and policy-analysis model, ToTEM, this paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Following the policy change, private agents assign a probability to the event that the policy-maker will revert to inflation-targeting next period. As this probability decreases and imperfect credibility abates, inflation expectations in the economy become consistent with price-level targeting. The paper finds a large welfare gain when imperfect credibility is short-lived. The gain becomes smaller with persisting imperfect credibility, turning to a loss if it lasts more than 13 years.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Bank of Canada in its series Working Papers with number 09-17.
Length: 34 pages
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
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Monetary policy framework; Monetary policy implementation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-06-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBA-2009-06-10 (Central Banking)
- NEP-MAC-2009-06-10 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2009-06-10 (Monetary Economics)
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- Jiri Bohm & Jan Filacek & Ivana Kubicova & Romana Zamazalova, 2011.
"Price-Level Targeting - A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?,"
Research and Policy Notes
2011/01, Czech National Bank, Research Department.
- Jiri Bohm & Jan Filacek, 2012. "Price-Level Targeting–A Real Alternative to Inflation Targeting?," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 62(1), pages 2-26, February.
- Hatcher, Michael C., 2011. "Inflation versus price-level targeting and the zero lower bound: Stochastic simulations from the Smets-Wouters US model," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2011/24, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Iulian Vasile Popescu, 2012. "Price-Level Targeting – A Viable Alternative To Inflation Targeting?," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 4, pages 809-823, December.
- Mark J. Carney, 2009. "Commentary: using monetary policy to stabilize economic activity," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 297-311.
- Hatcher, Michael C., 2011. "Comparing inflation and price-level targeting: A comprehensive review of the literature," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2011/22, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Michael Parkin, 2009. "What is the Ideal Monetary Policy Regime? Improving the Bank of Canada's Inflation-targeting Program," C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, C.D. Howe Institute, issue 279, January.
- Sofía Bauducco B. & Rodrigo Caputo G, 2011. "Metas de Nivel de Precios y Metas de Inflación: Una Revisión de la Literatura," Notas de Investigación Journal Economía Chilena (The Chilean Economy), Central Bank of Chile, vol. 14(1), pages 55-67, April.
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