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The Barcelonnettes: an Example of Network-Entrepreneurs in XIX Century Mexico. An Explanation Based on a Theory of Bounded Rational Choice with Social Embeddedness

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Author Info
Gonzalo Castañeda () (Departamento de Economía, Universidad de las Américas, Puebla)
Abstract

A theory of network-entrepreneurs or ‘spin-off system’ is presented in this paper for the creation of firms based on the community’s social governance. It is argued that firm’s capacity for accumulation depends on the presence of employees belonging to the same social/ethnic group with expectations of ‘inheriting’ the firm and becoming entrepreneurs once they have been selected for their merits and loyalty towards their patrons. Such accumulation is possible because of the credibility of the patrons’ promises of supporting newcomers due to high social cohesion and specific social norms prevailing in the community. This theory is exemplified through the case of the Barcelonnettes, a group of immigrants from the Alps in the South of France (Provence) who came to Mexico in the XIX Century.

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File URL: http://selene.uab.es/dep-economia-empresa/documents/04-2.pdf
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File Function: First version, 2004
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Paper provided by Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona in its series Working Papers with number 200402.

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Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:bbe:wpaper:200402

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  1. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2001. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Working Papers 01-01-003, Santa Fe Institute.
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  2. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Greif, Avner, 1993. "Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: the Maghribi Traders' Coalition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(3), pages 525-48, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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