All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus
AbstractThere exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyerseller exact representative.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia in its series Working Papers in Economics with number 114.
Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Espai de Recerca en Economia, Facultat de CiÃ¨ncies EconÃ²miques. Tinent Coronel Valenzuela, Num 1-11 08034 Barcelona. Spain.
Web page: http://www.ere.ub.es
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-06-02 (All new papers)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Espai de Recerca en Economia).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.