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Corruption in the Tax Administration: Is there Scope for Wage Incentives?

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Author Info

  • Konstantin Pashev

    (Governance Monitoring Association Sofia and New BUlgarian University)

  • Neven Valev

    (Department of Economics, Georgia State University)

  • Vanya Pasheva

    (The World Bank)

Abstract

We use unique survey data from Bulgaria’s tax administration to evaluate the determinants of corruption risk. We construct a novel measure of corruptibility, defined as the gap between actual income and the self-reported corruption-proof income. The survey data show that raising incomes leads to lower corruption risk. However, incomes would have to almost triple to eliminate the risk of corruption, which makes such a policy intervention politically and financially unfeasible. The results suggest that strengthening monitoring and control might be more cost-effective for addressing corruption risks in the case of the tax administration in Bulgaria. They also suggest that gender, age, and tenure can be used to inform human resource allocation.

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File URL: http://icepp.gsu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/icepp/wp/ispwp1023.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University in its series International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU with number paper1023.

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Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 01 May 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ays:ispwps:paper1023

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Keywords: taxes; corruption; wage policy; Bulgaria;

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