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Evolution of Conventions in an Experimental Public Goods Game with Private and Public Knowledge of Advice

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  • Chaudhuri, Ananish
  • Graziano, Sara

Abstract

We adopt an inter-generational approach to the public goods game where at the end of each session one generation of subjects leave advice for the succeeding generation via free form messages. Such advice can be private (advice left by one player in generation t is given only to her immediate successor in generation t+1) or public (advice left by players of generation t is made available to all members of generation t+1). We find that when advice is public it generates a process of social learning that helps increase contributions over time and also mitigates problems of free riding. Our results suggest that contrary to game theoretic predictions, communities may be able to achieve efficient or near efficient levels of public good provision on the basis of private contributions.

Suggested Citation

  • Chaudhuri, Ananish & Graziano, Sara, 2003. "Evolution of Conventions in an Experimental Public Goods Game with Private and Public Knowledge of Advice," Working Papers 201, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
    • Handle: RePEc:auc:wpaper:201
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2292/201
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    Cited by:

    1. Chaudhuri, Ananish & Maitra, Pushkar & Graziano, Sara, 2003. "A Dynamic Analysis of the Evolution of Conventions in a Public Goods Experiment with Intergenerational Advice," Working Papers 152, Department of Economics, The University of Auckland.
    2. Richard H. McAdams & Janice Nadler, 2005. "Testing the Focal Point Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third‐Party Expression in an Experimental Hawk/Dove Game," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 2(1), pages 87-123, March.

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    Keywords

    Public goods; Economics;

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