The Shaping of Research Agendas in International Economic Organizations: Illustrations from the World Bank, IMF and OECD

We investigate the determinants, development, character and distinctiveness of research programmes in international economic organisations (IEOs). In the twentieth century, IEOs emerged as another domain - in addition to government, business and academia - in which economists demonstrated the value of their intellectual constructs. What were the forces shaping economic thought in IEOs? How does the incorporation of new ideas in IEO research affect policy prescriptions emanating from IEOs? We offer illustrations from the IMF, OECD, and World Bank drawn from work in the late 1960s to the early 1980s. We view the subject matter as a variant of Schumpeterian 'political economy' rather than pure analytical economics. Economic research in IEOs enabled economists to assume positions as critical intellectual actors in IEO policy formation. Key determinants of economic thought in IEOs included the rationale for the existence of a particular organisation as expressed in formal charters or constitutions; contemporary ideas disseminated from academic economic analysis, and pressures applied by member governments to research and advise on specific policy questions either as events or operational functions demanded. We consider the World Bank as a purveyor of development strategies, in particular the concept of 'structural adjustment' in the 1980s; the self-styled monetary approach to the balance of payments prosecuted at the IMF from the 1960s to the 1980s, and the OECD policy line on economic policy reform in developed industrialised countries in the late 1970s. IEO research agendas were predominantly aimed at problems resulting from international economic interdependencies. We conclude that, for an IEO, international political economy was more likely to sway national policymakers if it employed a discourse - together with carefully chosen metaphors - turning on operational imperatives and articulating ruling policy concepts framed as part of eclectic, applicable models. We find little support for the public choice view of IEO research (and researchers) as involving bureaucratic and research budget maximization and strict research independence. Economic thought in IEOs is demand -driven though not completely demand- determined.