We present a model of spatial competition where transport costs are dependent on the price the monopolist sets in the market. Several specifications of the transport costs are modeled. We find that, in contrast with a standard Hotelling model, the monoplist decides to cover all the market ragardless of both the reservation price and the size of the market in all cases but one.
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
399.97.