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Abstract

This paper studies the incentives of short-lived agents to acquire costly private information in the presence of public signals arising from market interaction. It characterizes the social learning process, that is the revelation of information by public signals, and the information externalities involved. The analysis provides insights on the scope for government intervention.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 323.96.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:323.96

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Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
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Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
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Related research

Keywords: INFORMATION; COSTS;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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Cited by:

1. Marcello Miccoli, 2012. "Optimal dynamic public communication," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 856, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
2. Xavier Vives, 2011. "Endogenous Public Information and Welfare," CESifo Working Paper Series 3492, CESifo Group Munich.
   
   • Vives, Xavier, 2011. "Endogenous Public Information and Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 8437, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   • Vives, Xavier, 2011. "Endogenous public information and welfare," IESE Research Papers D/925, IESE Business School.
3. Celen, Bogachan & Hyndman, Kyle, 2006. "Endogenous Network Formation In the Laboratory," MPRA Paper 1440, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • Bogachan Celen & Kyle Hyndman, 2007. "Endogenous Network Formation in the Laboratory," Departmental Working Papers 0701, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
4. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2001. "Herd Behavior and Cascading in Capital Markets: A Review and Synthesis," MPRA Paper 5186, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • David Hirshleifer & Siew Hong Teoh, 2003. "Herd Behaviour and Cascading in Capital Markets: a Review and Synthesis," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 9(1), pages 25-66.
5. Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2008. "Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets," MPRA Paper 9164, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   
   • Hirshleifer, David & Teoh, Siew Hong, 2008. "Thought and Behavior Contagion in Capital Markets," MPRA Paper 9142, University Library of Munich, Germany.
6. Lars P. Feld & Benno Torgler & Bin Dong, 2008. "Coming Closer? Tax Morale, Deterrence and Social Learning after German Unification," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
   
   • Lars P. Feld & Benno Torgler & Bin Ding, 2008. "Coming Closer? Tax Morale, Deterrence and Social Learning after German Unification," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 232, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, revised 16 Jun 2008.
7. Marc-Andreas Muendler, 2005. "Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series 1436, CESifo Group Munich.
   
   • Muendler, Marc-Andreas, 2005. "Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt5q4764nj, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.

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