Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Social Learning and Costly Information Acquisition

Author Info

Burguet, R.
Vives, X.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper studies the incentives of short-lived agents to acquire costly private information in the presence of public signals arising from market interaction. It characterizes the social learning process, that is the revelation of information by public signals, and the information externalities involved. The analysis provides insights on the scope for government intervention.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 323.96.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:323.96

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 08193, Bellaterra, Barcelona
Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Xavier Vila).

Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION; COSTS;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Celen, Bogachan & Hyndman, Kyle, 2006. "Endogenous Network Formation In the Laboratory," MPRA Paper 1440, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Bogachan Celen & Kyle Hyndman, 2007. "Endogenous Network Formation in the Laboratory," Departmental Working Papers 0701, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Marc-Andreas Muendler, 2005. "Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2005-04, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Marc Andreas Mündler, 2005. "Rational Information Choice in Financial Market Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Lars P. Feld & Benno Torgler & Bin Ding, 2008. "Coming Closer? Tax Morale, Deterrence and Social Learning after German Unification," School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers and Working Papers Series 232, School of Economics and Finance, Queensland University of Technology, revised 16 Jun 2008. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lars P. Feld & Benno Torgler & Bin Dong, 2008. "Coming Closer? Tax Morale, Deterrence and Social Learning after German Unification," CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-09, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA). [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? RePEc encourages publishers to make their bibliographic data freely available to the public.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.