A Game-Theoretic Model of Predator-Prey Signalling.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 148.90.
Length: 17 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
economic models ; economic equilibrium;
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- Michael Lachmann & Carl T. Bergstrom, 1999. "When Honest Signals Must Be Costly," Working Papers 99-08-059, Santa Fe Institute.
- Carl Bergstrom & Michael Lachmann, 2000. "Alarm Calls as Costly Signals of Anti-Predator Vigilance: The Watchful Babbler Game," Working Papers 00-02-009, Santa Fe Institute.
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