Forward Induction: Experimental Evidence From Two-Stage Games With Complete Information
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 118-89.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
game theory ; decision making ; communication ; economic equilibrium;
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- Kritikos, Alexander S. & Tan, Jonathan H. W., 2005.
"Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test,"
241, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
- Alexander S. Kritikos & Jonathan H.W. Tan, 2006. "Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test," Working Papers 0005, Gesellschaft für Arbeitsmarktaktivierung (GfA).
- R. Muller & Asha Sadanand, 2003. "Order of Play, Forward Induction, and Presentation Effects in Two-Person Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 5-25, June.
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