IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/arz/wpaper/eres2016_298.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Do Rights of First Refusal Improve the Return of Singapore REITs?

Author

Listed:
  • Anh Duc Tran
  • Seow Eng Ong

Abstract

This paper examines the Right of First Refusal clauses for 36 public REITs and Property Trusts in Singapore, one of the largest REIT markets in Asia Pacific. Until now, little study has been conducted on the topic of Right of First Refusal (ROFR), which has been widely employed to provide acquisition pipeline for Singapore REITs, as to whether this clause improves the IPO and aftermarket performance of REITs. This question leads to two issues: firstly, how much the REIT sponsors and investors recognize the ROFR clause in the IPO Price and First-day Closing Price respectively; and secondly, whether having a ROFR clause leads to sustained better aftermarket performance for REIT.Analysing the mean IPO Underpricing, NAV Premium and IPO Price/ NAV of all S-REITs show that on average, S-REITs with a ROFR clause is more underpriced as relative to NAV per unit than those without. With reference to the signaling hypothesis, this result supports the Sponsor Recognition Hypothesis that holding a ROFR clause enables more underpricing and hence is an indication of better quality REIT. The analysis also provides evidences to support that S-REITs with a ROFR clause achieve better initial return and higher NAV premium, although the statistical significance of the findings is low.Analyses of aftermarket adjusted return show no significant outperformance for S-REITs with a ROFR clause. However, it is found that S-REITs with explicitly-stated properties in their ROFR clause performed significantly worse than those without. This result is tested to account for potential wealth creation effect created through acquisitions of new properties, and the test result shows consistency with earlier findings. The study findings also reinforce the results of earlier literature on the determinants of IPO Underpricing and aftermarket Holding Period Return.The study findings also reinforce the results of earlier literature on the determinants of IPO Underpricing and aftermarket Holding Period Return.

Suggested Citation

  • Anh Duc Tran & Seow Eng Ong, 2016. "Do Rights of First Refusal Improve the Return of Singapore REITs?," ERES eres2016_298, European Real Estate Society (ERES).
  • Handle: RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2016_298
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://eres.architexturez.net/doc/oai-eres-id-eres2016-298
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:arz:wpaper:eres2016_298. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Architexturez Imprints (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/eressea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.