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Chasing Contests

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  • Zhuo Chen
  • Yun Liu

Abstract

This paper proposes a dynamic research contest, namely the chasing contest, in which two asymmetric contestants exert costly effort to accomplish two breakthroughs in a continuous-time framework. The contestants are asymmetric in that one of them is present-biased and has already achieved one breakthrough (the leader), while the other is time-consistent and needs to achieve two breakthroughs to win (the chaser). The principal can choose between two disclosure policies, which either immediately announces the first breakthrough of the chaser (public chasing contest), or only announces the contest results until its terminus (hidden chasing contest). We fully characterize the unique x-start and y-stop equilibrium of the chasing contest with the two disclosure policies, in which the leader starts working from an instant x to the end while the chaser stops exerting effort by the instant y. We further compare the asymmetric incentives of the two disclosure policies. Our results imply that the chaser will never stop earlier in the hidden chasing contest compared to its public chasing counterpart, whereas the leader works longer in the public chasing contest only if the contest permits a late deadline.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhuo Chen & Yun Liu, 2024. "Chasing Contests," Papers 2404.02756, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2404.02756
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    File URL: http://arxiv.org/pdf/2404.02756
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