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The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing

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  • Jerry Anunrojwong
  • Santiago R. Balseiro
  • Omar Besbes

Abstract

In robust decision-making under non-Bayesian uncertainty, different robust optimization criteria, such as maximin performance, minimax regret, and maximin ratio, have been proposed. In many problems, all three criteria are well-motivated and well-grounded from a decision-theoretic perspective, yet different criteria give different prescriptions. This paper initiates a systematic study of overfitting to robustness criteria. How good is a prescription derived from one criterion when evaluated against another criterion? Does there exist a prescription that performs well against all criteria of interest? We formalize and study these questions through the prototypical problem of robust pricing under various information structures, including support, moments, and percentiles of the distribution of values. We provide a unified analysis of three focal robust criteria across various information structures and evaluate the relative performance of mechanisms optimized for each criterion against the others. We find that mechanisms optimized for one criterion often perform poorly against other criteria, highlighting the risk of overfitting to a particular robustness criterion. Remarkably, we show it is possible to design mechanisms that achieve good performance across all three criteria simultaneously, suggesting that decision-makers need not compromise among criteria.

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  • Jerry Anunrojwong & Santiago R. Balseiro & Omar Besbes, 2024. "The Best of Many Robustness Criteria in Decision Making: Formulation and Application to Robust Pricing," Papers 2403.12260, arXiv.org.
  • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2403.12260
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    References listed on IDEAS

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