The role of a matchmaker in buyer-vendor interactions
AbstractWe consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial matching problem. We compare the optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the impact of correlations on the system.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by arXiv.org in its series Papers with number 0902.0504.
Date of creation: Feb 2009
Date of revision: Jul 2009
Publication status: Published in European Physical Journal B 71, 565-571 (2009)
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Web page: http://arxiv.org/
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-09-26 (All new papers)
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- Tilles, Paulo F.C. & Ferreira, Fernando F. & Francisco, Gerson & Pereira, Carlos de B. & Sarti, Flavia M., 2011. "A Markovian model market—Akerlof’s lemons and the asymmetry of information," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 390(13), pages 2562-2570.
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