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Entry Deterrence and Multidimentional Competition in the Satellite Pay-TV Market

Author

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  • Nicola MATTEUCCI

    ([n.a.])

Abstract

This model analyses competition in the satellite pay-TV market. Duopolistic firms commit to offer TV programmes to attract subscribers to their broadcasting platforms. However, under certain cost conditions, a first mover advantage acquired in programmes can result in the monopolisation of the pay-TV market, due to network effects. Welfare analysis shows that consumers are better off with duopoly, particularly with symmetric duopoly. Total welfare can be higher under monopoly, but only in the region where the fixed costs of the TV programmes are low. Moreover, the model suggests that a more balanced (ideally, symmetric) duopoly, promoted with the antitrust intervention, would improve total welfare, with respect to the asymmetric duopoly that would affirm spontaneously. This model offers an analytical benchmark for some recent antitrust cases, where antitrust authorities have chosen to limit the accumulation of broadcasting rights as a mean to prevent the monopolization of the pay-TV market. In particular, our results support and even reinforce the rationale of the antitrust decisions adopted on the case of the proposed merger/acquisition between Telepiu' and Stream in Italy.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola MATTEUCCI, 2003. "Entry Deterrence and Multidimentional Competition in the Satellite Pay-TV Market," Working Papers 187, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
  • Handle: RePEc:anc:wpaper:187
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    File URL: http://docs.dises.univpm.it/web/quaderni/pdf/187.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2003
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Renato BALDUCCI, 2005. "Public Expenditure and Economic Growth. A critical extension of Barro's (1990) model," Working Papers 240, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    2. Amisano, Franco & Cassone, Alberto, 2005. "Proprieta' intellettuale e mercati: Il ruolo della tecnologia e conseguenze microeconomiche," POLIS Working Papers 58, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    3. Elvio MATTIOLI, 2003. "The measurement of coherence in the evaluation of criteria and its effects or ranking problems illustrated using a multicriteria decision method," Working Papers 199, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    4. Stefania BUSSOLETTI & Roberto ESPOSTI, 2004. "Regional Convergence, Structural Funds and the Role of Agricolture in the EU. A Panel-Data Approach," Working Papers 220, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    5. Nicola MATTEUCCI & Alessandro STERLACCHINI, 2003. "ICT and Employment Growth in Italian Industries," Working Papers 193, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    6. Marcello MESSORI & Alberto ZAZZARO, 2004. "Monetary profits within the circuit: Ponzi finance oer "mors tua, vita mea"?," Working Papers 200, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.
    7. Roberto ESPOSTI & Pierpaolo PIERANI, 2005. "Price, Private Demand and Optimal Provision of Public R&D in Italian Agriculture," Working Papers 238, Universita' Politecnica delle Marche (I), Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    antitrust law; intellectual property rights; network externalities; pay-tv;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L82 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Entertainment; Media

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