Adversity and the Propensity to Fail: The Impact of Disaster Payments and Multiple Peril Crop Insurance on U.S. Farm Exit Rates
AbstractThis paper investigates the effect of government-provided crop insurance on farm failure rates. By exploiting random variation in weather and the Federal Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which mandated crop insurance coverage for the first time, I employ two natural experiments that identify the causal effect of disaster relief on farm failure rates. I examine the survival smoothing contribution of crop insurance by looking at the relative effect of disaster relief across two regimes, pre- and post-1994. Prior to 1994 ad hoc, ex post disaster payments were the primary form of disaster relief. Shortly after the 1994 Act virtually all disaster relief came through crop insurance indemnities. I find that disaster relief in the form of ad hoc disaster payments slightly reduces the average farm failure rate, while average farm failure rates increase under the crop insurance regime. The relative effect suggests that farm failure rates increase by 1.7 percentage points (about 30-percent) under the crop insurance regime. Excessively generous ad hoc disaster payments and moral hazard provide possible explanations for these findings. These findings suggest that government-provided crop insurance plays an important role in farmer risk management.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its series 2009 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, 2009, Milwaukee, Wisconsin with number 49569.
Date of creation: 2009
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Agricultural Finance; Farm Management; Risk and Uncertainty;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2009-05-16 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2009-05-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-IAS-2009-05-16 (Insurance Economics)
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- Chakir, Raja & Hardelin, Julien, 2011. "Hail Insurance and Pesticide use in French agriculture: an empirical analysis of multiple risks management," 2011 International Congress, August 30-September 2, 2011, Zurich, Switzerland 114312, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Raja Chakir & Julien Hardelin, 2010.
"Crop Insurance and Pesticides in French agriculture: an empirical analysis of multiple risks management,"
2010/04, INRA, Economie Publique.
- Raja Chakir & Julien Hardelin, 2010. "Crop Insurance and Pesticides in French agriculture: an empirical analysis of multiple risks management," Working Papers hal-00753733, HAL.
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