NEP-EXP-2004-08-09

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Report NEP-EXP-2004-08-09

This is the archive for NEP-EXP, a report on new working papers in the area of Experimental Economics. Daniel Houser issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-EXP

The following items were anounced in this report:

Dickinson, David & Villeval, Marie-Claire, 2004. "Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort? The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories," IZA Discussion Papers 1222, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Nikos Nikiforakis, 2004. "Punishment and Counter-punishment in Public Goods Games: Can we still govern ourselves?," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/05, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
Dorothea Kuebler, Wieland Mueller and Hans Normann, 2004. "Job market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/02, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Apr 2004. [Downloadable!]
Item repec:wbk:wbrwps:32554 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
Item repec:wbk:wbrwps:36689 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
Hans Normann & Brian Wallace, 2004. "The Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/11, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]

This page was last updated on 2009-12-13.

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