Trust and Implicit Information Asymmetry in Repeated Games
AbstractThis article aims at presenting the way how a suitably long time perspective together with the learning process contributes to generating trust in mutual relation between various entities and how it is possibly to abuse this trust though the application and recognition of characteristics leading to the emergence of trust based on the learning process and implicit information asymmetry. Thanks to the analysis conducted it was possible to notice how much the model changes when we introduce an information asymmetry into it, particularly when the asymmetry in question involves the extent of time perspective. To achieve this, we applied measures used in the game theory that allowed us to construct a distinct, characteristic for a particular case game model based on results obtained in experimental studies.
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This chapter was published in: Piotr Markiewicz & Magdalena Adamus , , pages 739-746, 2013.
This item is provided by ToKnowPress in its series Active Citizenship by Knowledge Management & Innovation: Proceedings of the Management, Knowledge and Learning International Conference 2013 with number 739-746.
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repeated games; implicit information asymmetry; trust;
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