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Legislative Leaders as Condorcet Winners? The Case of the U.S. Congress

In: The Political Economy of Social Choices

Author

Listed:
  • Robert S. Erikson

    (Columbia University)

  • Yair Ghitza

    (Catalist)

Abstract

Legislative scholars recognize that legislative output is affected by the legislature’s institutional design. Let us assume that the goals are to avoid chaos and to enhance welfare. Toward these goals there are many variations. Strong committees (Shepsle and Weingast 1987), strong ruling parties (Cox and McCubbins 2004), institutions fostering legislative exchange (Weingast and Marshall 1988) and a strong agenda setter (Dahm and Glazer 2015) all can contribute to the interests a legislature’s members (see also Krehbiel 2004). In this chapter, we explore the potential gains from electing a strong agenda setter who holds the power to steer policy toward the setter’s own policy preferences. In the US context, one can loosely label this setter as a strong “speaker.” Would the election of a strong speaker lead to policies that represent the views of the chamber? And would it be possible to elect a strong speaker whose views are representative of the party in an open vote, given that theoretical models of multi-dimensional voting on policy suggest the absence of a predictable equilibrium outcome and the specter of endless cycling?

Suggested Citation

  • Robert S. Erikson & Yair Ghitza, 2016. "Legislative Leaders as Condorcet Winners? The Case of the U.S. Congress," Studies in Political Economy, in: Maria Gallego & Norman Schofield (ed.), The Political Economy of Social Choices, pages 73-91, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpocp:978-3-319-40118-8_4
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40118-8_4
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