The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement

Over the last decade, analytical tools in modern macro-comparative analysis have become increasingly sophisticated. Yet our concern with problems of causal inferences has, to a large extent, over-shadowed the equally important matters of conceptualization and measurement. Both the operationalization of highly elaborated analytical concepts and the empirical data employed are often crude and unsuitable for elaborate analysis. Furthermore, macro-comparative analysis has been criticized with regard to conceptual issues. It is claimed that highly aggregated data analysis lacks a micro-foundation and thus renders causal assumptions from structural data doubtful. This chapter focusses on veto player theory that currently attracts extensive attention in political science research and might be viable in order to mitigate the above mentioned analytical weaknesses. The chapter distinguishes between a veto point analysis, which has most analytical problems mentioned above, and veto player analysis. The latter has a micro-foundation rooted in rational choice theory. As veto player analysis is still flawed with regard to accounting for actors’ preferences and institutional settings, this chapter introduces a novel veto player index that is time variant for both aspects and thus achieves a fundamental improvement in veto player analysis. Although I do not overcome all analytical problems here, the new index is certainly a fundamental improvement for the veto player analysis.