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The open constitution and its enemies: Competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state

In: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2

Author

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  • Oliver Volckart

    (Unit 1: International Economics)

Abstract

The article presents a simple non-mathematical model that helps to explain how states emerged in medieval and early modern Central Europe. Classical feudalism is modelled as an essentially state-less political system, that is, as a market for military security characterized by intensive competition. The emergence of states is interpreted as the consequence of rent seeking taking place in this market after the medieval growth of population and the simultaneous reduction in transaction costs changed the market power of the parties contracting for the supply of security.

Suggested Citation

  • Oliver Volckart, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: Competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 527-543, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_30
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_30
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Constitutional history; State formation;

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • N4 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation

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