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On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games

In: Bilevel Optimization

Author

Listed:
  • Damien Bazin

    (Côte d’Azur University, CNRS, GREDEG)

  • Ludovic Julien

    (EconomiX, UPL, University Paris Nanterre, CNRS)

  • Olivier Musy

    (CRED, University Paris 2 Panthéon Assas)

Abstract

Hierarchical games with strategic interactions such as the Stackelberg two-stage game epitomize a standard economic application of bilevel optimization problems. In this paper, we survey certain properties of multiple leader–follower noncooperative games, which enable the basic Stackelberg duopoly game to encompass a larger number of decision makers at each level. We focus notably on the existence, uniqueness and welfare properties of these multiple leader–follower games. We also study how this particular bilevel optimization game can be extended to a multi-level decision setting.

Suggested Citation

  • Damien Bazin & Ludovic Julien & Olivier Musy, 2020. "On Stackelberg–Nash Equilibria in Bilevel Optimization Games," Springer Optimization and Its Applications, in: Stephan Dempe & Alain Zemkoho (ed.), Bilevel Optimization, chapter 0, pages 27-51, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:spochp:978-3-030-52119-6_2
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-52119-6_2
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