IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/spr/prbchp/978-3-030-26284-6_5.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Game Models of Competition in the Cargo Transportation Market

In: Global Economics and Management: Transition to Economy 4.0

Author

Listed:
  • V. Azarnaya

    (Tomsk State University)

  • V. Golov

    (Tomsk State University)

  • V. Ryumkin

    (Tomsk State University)

Abstract

This paper presents two novel game modelsGame model of competition in the cargo transportation marketCargo transportation market. In the proposed models, the type of carriers does not matter. They can be air carriers, sea carriers, rail or road carriers. However, the cargo transportation itself must be intermodal. The first model describes the competition of equal players acting independently without the right to form coalitions. For the individual carrier problems, Nash equilibrium is used to find the optimal decisions for which each carrier obtains the greatest profit. Nash equilibrium values are obtained for delivery volumes and prices, as well as players’ profits. The second model examined describes the competition of a number of stronger players with a number of weaker ones. As a game modelGame model of such competition, a modified Stackelberg model was considered. The model assumes an arbitrary number of equal leaders and an arbitrary number of equal followers. Within the framework of such a model, were determined the values of cargo transportation, the prices for deliveries, as well as the players’ profits in the equilibrium situation. A numerical example is presented to demonstrate the validity and capability of the model.

Suggested Citation

  • V. Azarnaya & V. Golov & V. Ryumkin, 2019. "Game Models of Competition in the Cargo Transportation Market," Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics, in: Mikhail Kaz & Tatiana Ilina & Gennady A. Medvedev (ed.), Global Economics and Management: Transition to Economy 4.0, chapter 0, pages 45-56, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-030-26284-6_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-26284-6_5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:prbchp:978-3-030-26284-6_5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.