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Co-evolutionary Agents in Combinatorial Sealed-bid Auctions for Spectrum Licenses Markets

In: Progress in Artificial Economics

Author

Listed:
  • Asuncion Mochon

    (UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Yago Saez

    (UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Jose Luis Gomez-Barroso

    (UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

  • Pedro Isasi

    (UNED and Universidad Carlos III de Madrid)

Abstract

Allocating scarce resources is a difficult duty governments must face. Furthermore, when participants exhibit complex preference structures (substitutes and complements) this task is even trickier. Combinatorial auctions are a good alternative for solving this problem. In this work we have developed a simulator of a combinatorial first-price sealed-bid auction. The bidding behaviour has been simulated by the application of co-evolutionary dynamics in an agent-based model. This model assumes independent bidders with bounded rationality trying to maximize profits. Finally, the simulations have been tested for two environments that involve the sale of spectrum licenses (digital dividend). These techniques are a helpful tool to support governments taking decisions in the awarding process.

Suggested Citation

  • Asuncion Mochon & Yago Saez & Jose Luis Gomez-Barroso & Pedro Isasi, 2010. "Co-evolutionary Agents in Combinatorial Sealed-bid Auctions for Spectrum Licenses Markets," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Marco Li Calzi & Lucia Milone & Paolo Pellizzari (ed.), Progress in Artificial Economics, pages 53-63, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-642-13947-5_5
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13947-5_5
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