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Game Representation - Code Form

In: The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions

Author

Listed:
  • Maria Cristina Peixoto Matos

    (Instituto Politécnico de Viseu - Escola Superior de Tecnologia de Viseu)

  • Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira

    (Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa)

Abstract

Summary When we analyze a game we want a full representation, i.e., we want to be able to look at a game and perceive all of its details. If it allows us to visualize the respective solution all the better. This aim was the reason for researching a new game representation which is described in this paper. The code form of a game consists mainly in a table containing all of the information with no suppression or “adulteration” with regards to the game. Initially presented at Fifth Spanish Meeting on Game Theory & European Voting Games (Seville 2002), based on examples, code form is put forth in this paper thoroughly. We begin by presenting code form, exemplifying it with four games. We finish proving the existence of Nash Equilibrium in code form games.

Suggested Citation

  • Maria Cristina Peixoto Matos & Manuel Alberto M. Ferreira, 2006. "Game Representation - Code Form," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Akira Namatame & Taisei Kaizouji & Yuuji Aruka (ed.), The Complex Networks of Economic Interactions, pages 321-334, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-540-28727-8_22
    DOI: 10.1007/3-540-28727-2_22
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    Keywords

    Game theory; Code Form;

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