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Emergence of Fair Offers in Ultimatum Game

In: Artificial Economics and Self Organization

Author

Listed:
  • Wanting Xiong

    (Beijing Normal University)

  • Han Fu

    (Beijing Normal University)

  • Yougui Wang

    (Beijing Normal University)

Abstract

The dynamics of how fair offers come about in ultimatum game is studied via the method of agent-based modeling. Both fairness motive and adaptive learning are considered to be important in the fair behavior of human players in concerning literature. Here special attention is paid to situations where adaptive learning proposers encounter responders with either pure money concern or fairness motivation. The simulation results show that the interplay of adaptive learning participants yields a perfect sub-game equilibrium, but fair offers will be provided by proposers as long as a small proportion of responders play “tough” against unfair offer.

Suggested Citation

  • Wanting Xiong & Han Fu & Yougui Wang, 2014. "Emergence of Fair Offers in Ultimatum Game," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Stephan Leitner & Friederike Wall (ed.), Artificial Economics and Self Organization, edition 127, pages 107-118, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:lnechp:978-3-319-00912-4_9
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00912-4_9
    as

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