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Tax Policy Under the “Generational Election System”

In: The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation in Japan

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  • Takero Doi

    (Keio University)

Abstract

This chapter investigates the effects of introducing the “generational election system” proposed by Ihori and Doi (Nihon-seiji no keizai-bunseki (Economic analysis of Japanese politics), Bokutaku-Sha, Tokyo, 1998). The generational election system (or the election district by generation) consists of election districts divided by not only region but also generation. In industrial countries, intergenerational conflicts of interest are large at present. In particular, the older generation has more political power because of aging and fewer children. In an electoral system that consists of election districts divided only by region, conflicts of interest among regions can be dealt with in the Congress, but intergenerational conflicts are buried in each district because the opinions of older people dominate those of younger people. Therefore, this chapter analyzes the effects of introducing the generational election system using an overlapping generations model. The results of the voting equilibrium show that the preferred policy of the younger generation can be better represented in the generational election system compared with the current majoritarian system. Furthermore, the selected policy does not depend on the turnout rate of the younger generation. These results suggest that introducing the generational election system benefits both the younger and future generations.

Suggested Citation

  • Takero Doi, 2015. "Tax Policy Under the “Generational Election System”," Advances in Japanese Business and Economics, in: Toshihiro Ihori & Kimiko Terai (ed.), The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidation in Japan, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 145-165, Springer.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:advchp:978-4-431-55127-0_6
    DOI: 10.1007/978-4-431-55127-0_6
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ihori, Toshihiro, 1987. "Tax reform and intergeneration incidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 377-387, August.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Generational Election System; Intergenerational equity; Tax policy; Turnout rate; Voting equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household

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