IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/pal/palchp/978-1-349-08596-5_8.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Workers versus Government—Who Adjusts to Whom?

In: Trade Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability

Author

Listed:
  • Tor Hersoug

    (University of Oslo)

Abstract

A dominant trade union and the government are regarded as players in a game. It is argued that the institutional setting is such that the union in effect makes the first move, and government the last. Then the Stackelberg solution with the union as the leader is a Nash equilibrium. This solution is in accordance with an accommodating policy, implying relatively high wage and price levels and a poor trade balance. A nonaccommodating policy with the unions as the follower would be preferred by the government, and may not imply lower employment, but is likely to require short-run losses in order to be established. A cooperative solution could be to mutual benefit, but is rarely observed. Problems of realizing such a solution are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Tor Hersoug, 1986. "Workers versus Government—Who Adjusts to Whom?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Lars Calmfors & Henrik Horn (ed.), Trade Unions, Wage Formation and Macroeconomic Stability, pages 128-150, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-08596-5_8
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-08596-5_8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-1-349-08596-5_8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.