IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/h/pal/palchp/978-0-230-52337-1_15.html
   My bibliography  Save this book chapter

Fairness in Stackelberg Games

In: Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour

Author

Listed:
  • Steffen Huck
  • Manfred Königstein
  • Wieland Müller

Abstract

In experiments, it is often observed that subjects do not play according to the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE). There is overwhelming evidence for this claim coming from sequential bargaining games. In its simplest form, the ultimatum game, introduced by Güth et al. (1982), the Proposer is predicted to claim (almost) the entire pie for him/herself while the Responder should accept all positive offers. Contrary to this prediction, one usually observes that the modal offer made by Proposers is a 50–50 split, and that Responders reject substantial positive offers.

Suggested Citation

  • Steffen Huck & Manfred Königstein & Wieland Müller, 2004. "Fairness in Stackelberg Games," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Steffen Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, chapter 15, pages 314-323, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52337-1_15
    DOI: 10.1057/9780230523371_15
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pal:palchp:978-0-230-52337-1_15. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.palgrave.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.