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Cohesive Institutions and the Distribution of Political Rents: Theory and Evidence

In: Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Timothy Besley

    (LSE
    CIFAR)

  • Hannes Mueller

    (IAE (CSIC)
    MOVE
    GSE)

Abstract

This paper considers how public resources are distributed across groups and how this depends on the institutional environment. It shows how executive constraints and openness should matter to this and argues that a key role for institutions is to protect politically excluded groups. It develops an approach to judging political institutions based on the idea that cohesive institutions play a role when there is uncertainty about the allocation of political power. Using spatial data on night light, it shows inequality is lower with executive constraints. In addition, politically excluded groups do better within countries when such constraints are in force.

Suggested Citation

  • Timothy Besley & Hannes Mueller, 2018. "Cohesive Institutions and the Distribution of Political Rents: Theory and Evidence," International Economic Association Series, in: Kaushik Basu & Tito Cordella (ed.), Institutions, Governance and the Control of Corruption, chapter 7, pages 165-208, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-3-319-65684-7_7
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-65684-7_7
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    Cited by:

    1. Gabriele Gratton & Barton E. Lee, 2020. "Liberty, Security, and Accountability: The Rise and Fall of Illiberal Democracies," Discussion Papers 2020-13a, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

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