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Psychological Variables and Coalition-Forming Behaviour

In: Risk and Uncertainty

Author

Listed:
  • Reinhard Selten
  • Klaus G. Schuster

Abstract

Game theorists have proposed several theories of coalition-forming behaviour. In this paper we shall consider only those which seem to be applicable to our experimental set-up (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Shapley, 1953; Luce, 1955; Aumann and Maschler, 1964; Davis and Maschler, 1963). These theories are generally considered normative, but even normative theories should have some proximity to real behaviour. Therefore it is interesting to compare experimental results with theoretical predictions.

Suggested Citation

  • Reinhard Selten & Klaus G. Schuster, 1968. "Psychological Variables and Coalition-Forming Behaviour," International Economic Association Series, in: Karl Borch & Jan Mossin (ed.), Risk and Uncertainty, chapter 0, pages 221-246, Palgrave Macmillan.
    • Handle: RePEc:pal:intecp:978-1-349-15248-3_10
    DOI: 10.1007/978-1-349-15248-3_10
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Chal Sussangkarn, 1978. "Equilibrium Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games with Transferability," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 22(1), pages 121-141, March.
    2. Pamela Oliver, 1984. "Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 28(1), pages 123-148, March.
    3. H. Andrew Michener & Melvin M. Sakurai & Kenneth Yuen & Thomas J. Kasen, 1979. "A Competitive Test of the M1 (i) and M1 (im) Bargaining Sets," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(1), pages 102-119, March.
    4. Pamela Oliver, 1980. "Selective Incentives in an Apex Game," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 24(1), pages 113-141, March.

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